The idea of the live broadcast of proceedings in the matter of the Presidential Election Petition, particularly television coverage, before the Supreme Court, was considered an abomination when the initiative came from the Danquah Institute.
Even after Kenya allowed its election petition to be beamed live from its Supreme Court, there were still some Ghanaians, many of them well-informed, who still felt the suggestion was an aberration or an affront to the dignity of our Supreme Court, because Ghana is not Kenya. Yet, the suggestion appeared to have popular appeal.
Thankfully, the Supreme Court itself saw reason and resiled from its earlier position; good reason gave way to a better one.
The court thus approved the live coverage, which has helped to ease anxieties, open up the issues before us, ensured openness and transparency, killed propaganda and misinformation.
The live coverage has also enabled Ghanaians to follow proceedings and observe how judges operate, the art of examination in chief and provided appreciation for cross-examination.
The people have seen the lines of questioning, whether insightful, monotonous or whatever.
More important, Ghanaians have been enabled to assess the credibility of witnesses by their demeanor and their sincerity and readiness or otherwise, in answering questions.
They have seen how judges make interventions in passing comments or asking questions. They have heard the voices of the judges and can put names to faces.
Those interested in statistics can count the number of times interim issues have been dealt with and can monitor which judges have voted for which issues.
All these are observed live on television and radio, in raw uncensored form, rather than through the eyes of partisan lawyers or media personnel and party communicators or commentators.
Therefore, when the judges complain of acts of omission or commission, which seek to undermine or prejudice the process, we can sympathise or identify with them or be dismissive of their complaints.
We can observe their even-handedness or biases as the process moves forward.
It is in this sense and in the face of the reprimand of Sammy Awuku, banned from the proceedings, and invitation to three others, to appear before the court, indicating that our lordships are being exercised by what they see as adverse commentary on the process, that it has become necessary to explain the issue of contempt of court.
The public has at one time or another, openly debated the issue of contempt of Parliament, but when it comes to Contempt of Court, it becomes something else. Possibly, because Parliament is open to partisan politics, different perspectives and interpretations could be discerned.
The 1992 Constitution defines contempt of Parliament as �an act or omission which obstructs or impedes Parliament in the performance of its functions or which obstructs or impedes a member or officer of Parliament in the discharge of his duties, or affronts the dignity of Parliament or which tends either directly or indirectly to produce that result�. (Article 122)
It further states under Article 123 that �where an act or omission which constitutes Contempt of Parliament is an offence under the criminal law, the exercise by Parliament of the power to punish by contempt shall not be a bar to the institution of proceedings under the criminal law�.
So, what is the position of the law on Contempt of Court, which in our case is open only to the Superior Courts of judicature, the High Court, Court of Appeal and Supreme Court? Indeed, there is no crime defined as Contempt of Court. The crime lies in the bosom of the Superior Court judges.
Article 19 (11) of the 1992 Constitution provides that �No person shall be convicted of a criminal offence unless the offence is defined and the penalty for it is prescribed in a written law�.
However, Article 19 (12) states that �Clause (11) of this article shall not prevent a Superior Court judge from punishing a person for contempt of itself notwithstanding that the act or omission constituting the contempt is not defined in a written law and the penalty is not so prescribed�.
Generally, contempt of court is seen as any act of omission or commission intended or is likely to undermine the administration of justice.
Thus contempt could be committed by deed or word to scandalise the Court, to make statements amounting to abuse of the courts or to make statements which tend to expose the courts or parties to prejudice, hatred or ridicule.
In a book, Contempt of Court, Oswald argues on page 6 that �to speak generally, contempt may be said to be constituted by any conduct that tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect, or disregard or to interfere with or prejudice parties, litigants and their witnesses during litigation�.
Halsbury�s Laws of England equally defines the concept as �scandalising the court itself, or abusing parties to actions or by prejudicing mankind in favour or against a party before the cause is heard�. Any act done or writing published which is calculated to bring a court or judge into contempt or to lower his authority or to interfere with the due course of justice or the lawful process of the court is contempt of court�.
Contempt of court could be criminal or civil, in the face of the court, in facie curia or outside the presence of the court, ex-facie curia. Therefore, statements or comments such as the Supreme Court judges cannot do anything or that either the petitioners or respondents have no case and are merely wasting our time, or that the evidence of petitioners or respondents have been shredded into nothingness, can be cited for contempt.
Having thus defined contempt, we would next time look at the justification or otherwise of our lordships being exercised by such comments or criticisms.
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